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Emil Avdaliani：A New Syria with Old Problems

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6 小時前

2026 年 1 月 2 日

明報

【明報文章】On December 8 one year passed since Bashar al-Assad’s downfall and the birth of a new Syria. The economic reconstruction of the country after a decade long civil war is now actively discussed especially given the lifting of a large part of US-imposed sanctions. Damascus now also enjoys positive relations with the Arab and the Western countries signaling a major break from the isolation the Assad-period country found itself in. The return of Syria into the international community is perhaps the biggest change from pre-2025 period.

On the ground, however, the circumstances are not entirely promising. Firstly, internally Syria remains as fractured along ethnic and religious lines as it had been till 2024. The Kurds occupying the north-eastern part of the country continue to defy the central authorities in Damascus by refusing to integrate their military and political command into the Syrian army. Then there are the Druze minority living in the south of the country along the border with Israel. Subject to persecution in 2025 and fearing that a new bout of killing could be reignited there is little hope for the moment that peaceful coexistence could be achieved.

The dividing lines between the Sunni and Shia followers, and the enmity and distrust between the Shia and the Alawite branches serve as a powerful reminder of persisting tensions all across the country. This all was present in the pre-2024 Syria albeit with a different degree.

What further complicates the situation and again resembles the aspects of the civil war era Syria is the continued foreign involvement. Russia, Israel, Turkey, the Western as well as Arab countries to which should be added Iran (though its influence in the country has dramatically diminished) – all these actors exercise a varying degree of influence in the country. Roles have changed though: Iran and Russia were dominant before 2024, but now fare badly, and especially the Islamic Republic. Israel was always a factor for the Assad dynasty, but since late 2024 the Jewish state has conducted relentless airstrikes and even carried out an overland military operation which extended its military control over the strategic Golan heights overlooking Damascus itself.

Russia has lost its key position in Syria as a provider of security to the Assad leadership and a major military power with the presence of two military bases on the Mediterranean seashore. This has changed as Russia’s military presence dwindled and the new Syrian leadership seemed bent on reneging on Assad era commitments made to Moscow. Eventually, the Russian side managed to improve its position by engaging the Syrian government and offered economic, security incentives. But most of all, however, it was Damascus that was interested in Russia would serve as a counter to Israel’s military overbearance.

The biggest change took place in Turkey’s position. Ankara had held parts of Syria’s northern territories as a precaution against potential Kurdish resurgence. Yet, with Assad’s fall, Turkey is now in a position to extend its military influence over large parts of the country through construction of military bases. Turkish companies also seek active involvement in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. Additionally, Ankara is seen by Damascus as yet another tool to rein in Israel’s ambitions. Turkey also looks at Syria as a launching pad for its trans-regional commercial and infrastructure projects. One of them is the restoration of the famous Hijaz railway, another – a commercial route through Syria to the Persian Gulf to link Turkish and Gulf Cooperation Council economies.

A new Syria thus struggles to emerge. It has a new government, and the ongoing geopolitical momentum underpins new hopes in Damascus and the neighboring countries that Syria will manage to transform into a centralized state with the control over its entire territory. Yet, those same geopolitical circumstances are undermining Syria and its territorial integrity. In a way, the civil war in Syria has not ended yet given the fact that foreign actors continue to actively interfere in the country’s domestic affairs. To this should be added ethnic and religious tensions. No less important are tensions within the Syria leadership itself – moderates are increasingly contested by more radical wings of the HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham).

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.