Emil Avdaliani : Trump Will Face a Different Middle East

【明報文章】The return of Donald Trump to the White House sends a wave of shock across the globe given the United States’ geopolitical influence. Yet one region particularly awaiting Trump’s return is the Middle East where the war in Gaza and southern Lebanon as well as Iran’s renewed efforts to pursue its nuclear program have reshaped the geopolitics on the ground.

One area of particular focus is the Persian Gulf where tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have decreased since March 2023 when through normalization facilitated by Oman, Iraq and most of all China, Tehran and Riyadh improved their ties. The normalization has already reached its highest point and now the two countries are working on expanding bilateral ties in the areas which lacked significant interaction before Iran and saudi Arabia cut their diplomatic ties in 2016. For instance, presently military drills, cooperation in security issues and generally closer political ties are being actively pursued reshaping the traditionally limited relations between Tehran and Riyadh.

This shift in calculus of the two Middle East powers was caused by a number of reasons. Most of all it was the US’ unwillingness to defend the Saudi Kingdom from external attacks such as the one in 2019 when Houthis, Yemen-based militia assaulted Saudi oilfields. The kingdom suddenly realized that continuation of extensive rivalry with Iran would be highly risky which led Riyadh to seek normalization of ties with Tehran. The latter too seized the momentum to wedge wider divide between Saudi Arabia and its traditional security partner, the United States.

Therefore, it is this changed reality on the ground in the Persian Gulf that Trump will face from January 2025 when he assumes presidency. Saudi Arabia as well as other Arab countries will be very much unwilling to join the United States in its expected campaign to put further pressure on Iran. Saudi Arabia is even unlikely to push for the normalization of ties with Israel as a part of the Abraham Accords, sponsored by Washington. The move will undermine the kingdom’s prestige in the Arab world and will rather exacerbate relations with the Islamic Republic.

Saudi Arabia is in a more comfortable position than what had four years ago. For the US to limit the kingdom’s improved ties with Iran, Washington would need to agree to what Riyadh has sought for years: formal security alliance with iron-clad defense commitments; closer military cooperation which would provide the kingdom with an easier access to American weaponry.

Saudi Arabia therefore now has enough room for geopolitical maneuver to obtain as much advantage from the US as possible. Moreover, Washington will likewise face a different posture from other Arab states of the Persian Gulf. First and foremost it is the United Arab Emirates which similar to Saudi Arabia seeks to build multiple partnerships. Russia, India, China, and Iran allow Abu-Dhabi to diversify away from its focus on the US and dependence on its security umbrella. For the UAE Trump’s return is about both opportunities and challenges. In some areas such as artificial intelligence development and military cooperation Abu-Dhabi will pursue closer ties with Washington, while in others – investments or bilateral trade – the country will favor Beijing.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia see Trump’s return as a period when the US foreign policy will turn highly transactional. Less attention will be paid to human rights or democracy building initiatives. Instead, the United States will pursue a more self-interested foreign policy. Though appealing, this transactional approach is something that makes the Middle East countries uncomfortable too. Trump might be easier to enter negotiations with, but his term is seen as highly unpredictable.

And finally under Trump 2.0 the Middle East is also different from what it was four years ago in one major aspect: great power involvement. Competition from China and Russia need not be seen as aimed at replacing Washington’s power in the region. But growing Chinese influence and Russia’s enduring military presence in the Middle East affairs offer a valuable alternative for regional countries who prefer multiplicity of actors to the US-led order. This is well seen in the expanding relations between the wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf and China as well as between Russia on the one hand and Turkey and Iran on the other.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

[Emil Avdaliani]