Emil Avdaliani：Iran Pushes for Greater Influence in Its Immediate Neighborhood

【明報文章】Several interesting developments have taken place in the Middle East over the past few weeks. This was a mixture of diplomacy, tensions as well as outright attacks on each other. First is the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian’s visit to Iraq. In many ways hailed as historic the trip signaled the Iran’s continuous interest in the neighboring country.

Iran is interested in the construction of a railway section between Basra and Shalamcheh. The project holds significant importance for Tehran as it will allow the country to increase trade and people-to-people contacts between the two countries and especially the two regions. Iraq’s Basra and surrounding territories are mostly inhabited by Shiite population and Iran eyes influence there.

More broadly, Iran, through the Basra-Shalamcheh railway also wants to be better linked to gradually materializing The Development Road, an ambitious project which aims at connecting Turkey to the Persian Gulf via the entire length of Iraq’s territory. Seen as a rival to the IMEC corridor from India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Development Road is now actively championed by Ankara and Baghdad. Indeed, compared to previous decades, presently geopolitical situation on the ground favors the implementation of the project. Iraq is now far more stable; the Western troops will likely leave the country in the next several years and the Turkey is lobbying for the quick realization of the project.

Since, Iran is excluded from both initiatives and is especially unlikely to prevent IMEC from materializing, the Development Road is geographically closer, and Tehran possesses far greater number of tools to either influence or take part in the project. For instance, Iran exerts considerable influence over Iraq through a web of militarized Shia groupings which form a part of the wider network known as the Axis of Resistance spanning multiple countries across the Middle East. Security of the Development Road could therefore, to a certain extent, depend on the benevolence of the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian president also visited Iraq’s region of Kurdistan. Foreign leaders usually prefer Erbil as a focal point in their trips to the region, but this time Pezeshkian visited both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah as an evidence of how equal and powerful two Kurdish parties are – KDP and PUK – which dominate the Iraqi Kurdistan. There were raised questions of security as Iran has been worried over the border insecurity with the Iraqi Kurdistan. The visit was essentially about enforcing the security agreement signed in 2023 between Baghdad and Tehran over dismantling the presence of some Kurdish formations on the border with Iran.

Pezeshkian’s visit to Iraq was his first foreign trip as Iran’s president signifying the importance the country holds in Iran’s strategic vision of the neighborhood. Iraq is also seen as a buffer zone and a critical element in the forward-defense strategy of the Islamic Republic. Amid the spiraling rivalry with Israel and uncertainties around US’ position in the Middle East, Iran is bent on expanding its influence over Iraq – a telling sign of new Iranian president and its team’s foreign policy vision.

Prior to the Iraq visit Tehran has also experienced discomfort over Russia’s position on South Caucasus where Azerbaijan wants to build a corridor through Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik. Iran fears that a Turkic corridor (from Turkey to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea) would create problems for Iran’s northern provinces which are mostly inhabited by ethnic Turkic-speaking peoples. More importantly, Iran is worried that that a corridor through Armenia will limit the connection with this country through which the Islamic Republic aims at reaching Georgia and its Black Sea ports.

Therefore, when Russia in early September once again raised the issue of the corridor, Iranian politicians and political commentators were notably exasperated. This led to Tehran summoning the Russian ambassador to Iran and uncomfortable exchange with the Russian side, which tried to tone down the tensions. The incident has once again highlighted that despite close cooperation between Iran and Russia they often have conflicting interests whether it is in the Middle East or the South Caucasus.

Iran’s foreign policy under the new president is unlikely to experience tectonic shifts, but there already are different tactical plays which indicate that some changes are to happen. Tehran will pursue its core strategic interests as shown in the case of Iraq and Armenia but will also be more open to reaching an understanding with the collective West over its nuclear program. The success of this policy is far from guaranteed, but it shows that the country wants to build more equidistant foreign policy from each major global actor.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

[Emil Avdaliani]