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Emil Avdaliani:Conflagration in the Middle East Will Weigh Heavily on Ukraine

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【明報文章】As Russia’s war on Ukraine approaches a two-year anniversary, uncertainty around the conflict increases. Internal divisions in the West have always had debilitating effect on Kyiv’s war effort, but the recent geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East present a far bigger problem.

The region is in chaos. It still is a managed one, but there are signs that the overall geopolitical situation in the Middle East could quickly unravel, which will increase possibility of the West further weakening its support for Kyiv.

The war in Gaza, unfolding crisis in the Red Sea, and Iran-US tensions which recently even led to the killings of the three American soldiers – these developments are clear signs of shifting world order. We are entering uncharted waters. The international relations have become more chaotic leaving very little trace of erstwhile stability.

A longer-term perspective is thus unpromising for Ukraine. The wars and tensions in the Middle East serve as a distraction for the collective West and the US in particular. Russia, and other Eurasian powers skillfully use the momentum to advance their own interests whether in the Middle East itself or respective geopolitical arenas. Then there is a series of so-called middle powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey which tend to use greater powers’ weaknesses and strengthen their profiles.

The distraction is a daunting challenge, however. The US has a long history of having its hard power diverted to more immediate and less consequential troubles rather than focusing on longer term, systematic challenges. War on terrorism in early 2000s was aptly used by Russia to solidify its positions in the immediate geographic neighborhoods.

Now Moscow believes that the Middle East conflagration is another example of distraction and more importantly a confirmation of how flawed the US-led global order is and that there is little time left until a true and just multipolar world emerges.

The Middle East has now again turned into a pivotal geopolitical arena. Even for US, which before the war in Gaza was reconsidering its position in the Middle East by paying more attention to Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific region, now is intent on re-gaining its major role. The exacerbating geopolitical tensions from Gaza to the Red Sea to Iraq and Syria indicate, however, that it is unclear how Washington will maintain its central role. Much will depend on its ability to bring order to the Red Sea and facilitate the Arab-Israeli reconciliation.

So far, the progress on these two issues has been minimal. The Saudis announced that no reconciliation would take place unless a two-state solution is in place – a scenario ruled out by the present Israeli govenment. The retaliatory attacks on the Houthi positions in Yemen carried out by the US and its allies have not brought any meanigful results. Either they have not been strong enough or were carried out late so that the Houthis are now able to re-group and project their power with renewed vigor.

Given the high likelihood that the war in Ukraine will evolve into a long war, any distraction in the US will wigh heavily on Kyiv. To this should be added an already existing ambivalence which exists in some Western countries regarding the continuation of military aid to Ukraine. The latter’s ground counter-offensive has not lived up to expectations spurring debates on how able is Ukraine to defeat the well-entrenched Russians troops.

Though many in the West might think that Moscow is seriously intent on some kind of peace in Ukraine, it is still highly unlikely largely because the views from Kremlin are now much less bleaker than what it was a year ago. The risks of a much greater conflagration in the Middle East are real because of too many variables that the US cannot control and because its deterrence measures against Iranian-supported groups do not work. This also means that regardless of US efforts, its power is being dangerously dispersed across multiple theaters of war.

Moscow knows this and it will push harder in Ukraine – keeping occupied territories will not be enough. Russian leaders will likely demand additional buffer zone, or demilitarized areas. Expanded Russia too wants security guarantees as it did before the 2022 invasion. In fact, that is how Russian imperium grew over centuries.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

(本網發表的時事文章若提出批評,旨在指出相關制度、政策或措施存在錯誤或缺點,目的是促使矯正或消除這些錯誤或缺點,循合法途徑予以改善,絕無意圖煽動他人對政府或其他社群產生憎恨、不滿或敵意)

[Emil Avdaliani]

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